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Abstract
Can false memories have a positive consequence on human cognition?  In two experiments we
investigated whether false memories could prime insight problem-solving tasks.  Children and
adults were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had
been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lure
was also the solution to the problem.  In Experiment 1 the results showed that regardless of age,
when the critical lure was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and
significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list.  When the critical lure was
not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different than when there
was no DRM priming.  In Experiment 2, without an intervening recall test, children and adults
still exhibited higher solution rates and faster solution times to CRATs that were primed than
CRATs that were not primed.  This latter result shows that priming occurred as a result of false
memory generation at encoding and not at retrieval during the recall test.  Together these findings
demonstrate that when false memories are generated at encoding they can prime solutions to
insight-based problems in both children and adults.
Keywords: False memory; Problem solving; Compound remote associates task;
Memory and reasoning
A Brighter Side to Memory Illusions:
False Memories Prime Children’s and Adults’ Insight-based Problem Solving.
It is well known that memory is error-prone and that errors frequently lead to false
memory illusions (i.e., an illusion that takes the form of a belief that something had actually been
present when in fact it was not – Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  Such spontaneous
errors of commission can be studied using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm
where participants are given word lists (e.g., nap, doze, dream, pillow) whose members are all
associates of an unpresented item or critical lure (e.g., sleep).  Despite never having been
presented, participants often falsely remember the critical lure as being presented in the list.
When studied developmentally, these spontaneous false memories increase with age (e.g., Howe,
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009).
By now, we are all too familiar with the darker or negative side of false memory illusions.
 From experts being more prone to false memories in their domains of expertise (Castel, McCabe,
Roediger, & Heitman, 2007), to miscarriages of justice (Loftus, 2003), to the outright memory
wars of the 1990s (Crews, 1995).  However, we argue that there is also a brighter, more positive
side to false memories, one that is similar to that usually attributed to true memories.  This
positive aspect of false recollection is the role they can play in more complex cognitive processes
such as insight-based problem solving.
To see this brighter side, consider the notion that false memories like false beliefs (e.g.,
McKay & Dennett, 2009) may be the consequence of some creative process.  For example, Castel
et al. (2007) found that because experts have rich and highly interconnected memory networks in
their area of expertise they are more prone to memory errors related to that expertise.  It may be,
then, that generation of related information, including information not presented (i.e., false
memories), is related to the discovery of creative solutions to problems (Sio & Ormerod, 2009),
solutions that may depend on spreading activation through well-integrated associative networks
that are said to serve as a foundation for human thought (Anderson, 1983; Reder, Park, &
Kieffaber, 2009).
            One way to investigate this brighter side to false memories is by asking whether false
memories can prime solutions to insight-based problems such as those found in the Compound
Remote Associates Task (CRAT).  Originally developed by Mednick (1962), these tasks involve
the presentation of three words, for example, apple, family, house, all of which can be linked by a
single word, in this case tree.  In order to gain insight and solve this problem, theorists have
suggested a process involving spreading activation, one that continues until the correct concept
has been activated (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005).  If we also assume that
false memories are caused by a spreading activation mechanism (Howe et al., 2009; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995), then priming becomes an ideal area of investigation (Anderson, 1983).
In true memory, priming has been interpreted in terms of an enhanced speed and tendency
to complete tasks, such as stem completion tasks, when their completion involves the use of a
word previously studied (e.g., Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985).  McDermott (1997) found that
critical lures could also be used to prime word-stem and fragment-completion tasks, although
priming occurred at a level lower than if the items had actually been studied (see Diliberto-
Macaluso, 2005, for similar findings with child participants).  Similarly, McKone and Murphy
(2000) showed that critical lures could prime solutions to both implicit (stem-completion) and
explicit (stem-cued recall) memory problems.  The question addressed here is whether false
memories can also prime more complex cognitive tasks.
We suspect they can because problems requiring a high level of insight may be aided by
the spreading activation of concepts in memory, a process similar to the mechanisms proposed in
spreading activation models of false memory effects (e.g., Howe et al., 2009; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) as well as Underwood’s (1965) original implicit associative response model.
For example, Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) discovered that insight problem solving involves
searching through related concepts in memory for relevant information.  Bowden et al. (2005) also
suggested that insight-related problem solving involves the activation of concepts in memory,
including ones that are unrelated to the solution, followed later by the weak activation of concepts
that are critical to the solution.  Indeed, research has already shown that true memories can be
used to prime problem solving and reasoning tasks successfully (e.g., Kokinov, 1990), so it may
not be too far-fetched to anticipate that false memories might also prime problem solutions.  In
fact, some evidence has recently emerged showing that at least for adults, false memories can and
do prime solutions to CRAT problems.  However, this priming only occurred when the critical
lure was falsely remembered on a recall test and not simply due to the presentation of a DRM list
whose critical lure was not falsely recalled (Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, in press).
In the current research, we wanted to replicate this finding with adults but more
importantly, extend these priming effects to children.  This question is important developmentally
for any number of reasons.  For example, recall that children are less susceptible than adults to
spontaneous false memory illusions especially those induced using the DRM paradigm (e.g.,
Howe et al., 2009).  One reason for this may be because spreading activation is less automatic in
children’s than adults’ memory networks (see Howe, 2005; Howe et al., 2009; Wimmer & Howe,
2009, 2010).  Interestingly, these differences are often attenuated (although not always eliminated)
when age-appropriate materials (ones that are congruent with children’s knowledge base) are used
(e.g., Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008).  To the extent that spreading activation is also important to
solving CRAT problems we were interested in whether limitations in automaticity might also
constrain children’s problem solving abilities even when age appropriate problems were used.
We examined this question by using CRATs whose baseline solution rates were relatively
high for both children and adults.  That is, we used age-appropriate CRATs as determined by a
norming study that we present next.  Thus, although we predicted there might exist the usual age
increases in false recall despite using age-appropriate lists, we were interested in whether we
could attenuate (or eliminate) age differences in problem solving rates by using age-appropriate
problems.  Indeed, age differences in problem difficulty were not, in and of themselves, of interest
in this study.  Rather, we wondered whether false memories could serve the same priming
function for children as they can for adults when problem difficulty was equated across age.
Pilot Study: Norming CRAT Problems for use with Children
Before turning to the main experiments, we report a pilot study in which we collected
norms for CRAT problems for use with children.  Although the other experiments in this article
concern only one child age group (11-year-olds) in contrast to adults, the norming study examined
CRAT solution rates and times for 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds.
Method
Participants
            A total of 60 participants (Males = 28, Females = 32) took part in this experiment, 20 7-
year-olds (M = 7 years, 3 months; SD = 5 months), 20 9-year-olds (M = 9.5, SD = 3 months), and
20 11-year-olds (M = 11 years, 3 months; SD = 4 months).  The children, mostly White and from
middle class families, were tested following parental consent and their own assent on the day of
testing.
Materials
            Children were presented with 20 CRAT problems.  Although the majority of these were
taken from Mednicks (1982) original problems and Bowden and Jung-Beeman’s (2003) normative
data collection, some problems were added or modified to suit the age range that was tested.  The
items on the CRAT all required a solution that was a word associated with all three words of the
triad through the construction of a compound word or common phrase (e.g.,
cream/skate/water form compounds using the word ice, thus; ice-cream, ice-skate, ice water).
Bowden and Jung-Beeman provided normative data for 144 problems, however due to the age-
range being tested in this sample and the level of difficulty of a number of the problems we only
selected the problems that met the following criteria: Solutions to the presented problems must
have been used previously as critical lures to associative and categorized word lists.  Only
problems with solution rates of above 30% (in the adults norms) and solved within 30 sec by
adults were selected for norming with children. All the solution words had familiarity ratings of
500 or higher (with the maximum entry of 645, and a mean of 566; Coltheart, 1981) and a word
frequency of 10 or higher (maximum entry 686, and a mean of 126; Kucera and Francis 1967).
Procedure
            Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  Instructions similar to Bowden and
Jung-Beeman were given.  Participants were told that they would see three items and that they
should try and produce a fourth word, which, when combined with each of the three items, would
make up a common compound word or phrase.  The participants were also given three
demonstrations by the experimenter followed by two practice problems prior to the experiment
itself.  The three problem words were presented on a computer laptop screen simultaneously in a
horizontal orientation, one above, below, and at the center point.  The participants were given 40
sec (the longest time limit used by Bowden and Jung-Beeman was 30 sec) to produce the solution.
 If the solution was produced within the time limit, both the solution and the solution time were
recorded and the next problem was presented.  If the participant did not produce the correct
response within the time limit, the solution was provided by the experimenter and the program
automatically moved on to the next problem.
Results
            Although in the experiments reported in this article we only used the norms for 11-year-
olds, we present the results for all three ages in Table 1.  Here we present the average solution
rates and times for the 20 problems separately for 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds.  With these norms in
hand, we turn now to the main questions concerning the role of false memories in priming




            Sixty participants, 30 11-year-olds (M = 11 years, 2 months; SD = 4 months) and 30 adults
(M = 18 years, 5 months; SD = 8 months) participated in the experiment.  Parental consent was
obtained for all child participants as well as their own assent on the day of testing.  Adult
participants provided written informed consent prior to the study.  Child participants were drawn
from predominantly White, middle-class schools.  All participants were fluent in English.
Design, Materials, and Procedure
            A 2(Age: 11- and 18-year-olds) x 2(Priming: primed and unprimed) mixed design was
used where the first factor was between-participants and the second factor was manipulated within-
participant.  For purposes of the analyses, primed items were further divided according to whether
participants falsely remembered the critical lure (designated “primed/FM”) or failed to falsely
remember the critical lure (designated “primed/No-FM”) resulting in a 2(Age) x 3(Priming)
design.  Each participant was primed on half of the CRAT problems with a preceding DRM list
whose critical lure was also the solution to one of the CRAT problems.  Following study-test trials
on four DRM lists, participants attempted to solve all eight CRAT problems.  Each participant
was randomly assigned four DRM lists, and both the order of the DRM lists and CRAT problems
were carefully counterbalanced to eliminate order effects.  The DRM lists and CRAT problems
used in this article are provided in the Appendix.
            Eight CRAT problems were selected from the normative data produced by Bowden and
Jung-Beeman (2003) for adults and the norms we collected for children.  We selected those
CRATs whose solution rates were 30% or more for inclusion in these experiments.  The CRATs
selected for the adults have similar solution rates.  For each of the selected CRATs, a DRM list
was also used, each consisting of 13 associates of the critical lure (associates that overlapped with
the CRAT cue words were eliminated from each DRM list so that none of the presented DRM
associates overlapped with the three cue words used in the CRAT problems; see Appendix).  Lists
were selected because their critical lure was the same as the solution word used in the selected
CRAT problem.  DRM lists were taken either from standard sources (Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) or were developed based on the normed associates created by Nelson,
McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998).  Lists were randomly divided into two groups of four.
Participants were primed on half the DRM lists first and then completed all eight CRAT
problems.  The two sets of four DRM lists were equated on backward associative strength (BAS)
(List set 1 BAS = .189; List set 2 BAS = .186).
We also controlled for other word characteristics known to affect children’s and adults’
memory.  Word frequency values were taken from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al.,
2007), and concreteness, familiarity, and meaningfulness values were obtained from the Colorado
norms (Toglia & Battig, 1978).  Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted in order to
insure that the DRM lists chosen for each age group were matched across ages for BAS, word
frequency, concreteness, familiarity, and meaningfulness (all Fs < 1).  Like the DRM lists, we
also controlled the CRATs for word frequency (the English Lexicon Project, Balota et al., 2007)
as well as concreteness, familiarity, and meaningfulness (the Colorado norms, Toglia & Battig,
1978).  ANOVAs were conducted to insure that CRAT problems were matched across age groups
for BAS, word frequency, concreteness, familiarity, and meaningfulness (again, all Fs < 1).
            Participants were given four out of the eight DRM lists in a randomized order.  Each list
was presented verbally, followed by a distractor task (counting backwards by threes for 30
seconds for adults and a symbol matching task for children), and were then asked to orally recall
as many words as they could remember from the list.  Recall was self-paced and was terminated
after participants were unable to remember any new items, even when prompted for more items.
Once this had been repeated for each of the four lists, participants completed all eight CRAT
problems.  Participants were first given an example, followed by two practice CRAT problems
before they began.  Each CRAT was presented on a computer screen and verbally, in random
order, and participants were asked to provide a verbal solution.  If participants failed to correctly
solve a CRAT, they were given feedback as to the correct answer after each problem.  Solution
times were measured from the problem onset to the time the participant gave their response, with
participants having a maximum of one minute to complete the problem before they were
considered to have failed to solve the problem.
Results and Discussion
            False memory rates were comparable to other studies using recall measures (e.g., Howe et
al., 2009) with adult participants falsely recalling the critical lure an average of 68% of the time
and children 52% of the time.  This difference was statistically reliable, t(59) = 4.58, p < .01, and
confirms the usual increase in spontaneous false memories from childhood to adulthood.  The
mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) were
calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of 2(Age: 11- and 18-year-olds)
x 3(Priming: primed/FM, primed/No-FM, and unprimed) analyses of variance (ANOVAs).  For
primed CRAT problems, solution rates and solution times were conditionalized on whether the
participant had produced the critical lure during recall (i.e., primed/FM = critical lure produced
and primed/No-FM = no critical lure produced).  Thus, both solution rates and solution times were
subjected to separate ANOVAs where the only factor was solution type (unprimed vs. primed/No-
FM vs. primed/FM).  The data are shown in Table 2.
Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for priming, F(2, 64) = 16.80, p < .001,
(2p = .344, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s LSD) showed that solution rates were higher for
primed/FM problems (M = .86) than primed/No-FM (M = .67; p < .01) and unprimed (M = .64;
p < .01) problems, and the latter two did not differ.  As expected given our use of child-normed
CRATs, there was no main effect for age, where children (M = .70) and adults (M = .76) solved
similar numbers of CRATs.
Concerning solution times, there was a main effect for priming, F(2, 64) = 13.04, p < .001,
(2p = .289, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s LSD) showed that solution times were faster for
primed/FM problems (M = 18.02) than primed/No-FM (M = 24.67; p < .01) and unprimed (M =
28.49; p < .01) problems, and the latter two did not differ.  Like solution rates, we did not expect
any effects of age on solution times given the child-friendly nature of our CRATs.  Indeed, no age
differences were observed with children’s average problem solving time being 23.33 seconds and
adults’ being 24.12 seconds.
The findings from this study are the first to demonstrate that false memories can prime
insight-based problem solving in both children and adults.  It was clear that when problem
solutions were primed by the prior presentation of DRM lists whose critical lures were falsely
remembered and that were the solution to that problem, both the probability of, and speed with
which, such problems were solved improved significantly.  This was true regardless of whether
the problem solvers were children (11-year-olds) or adults (18-year-olds).  Key to this finding is
that it was not simply the presentation of the DRM list that primed the problem solution, but
rather, the participant must also have falsely remembered that item as one having been presented
in the list.  That is, the false memory must become part of the “presented” list and be recalled
along with the items that were actually presented.  Importantly, we are not claiming that it is the
memory test itself that is key to priming CRATs, although such testing does “reactivate” DRM
associates and critical lures that are remembered.  Rather, activation of the critical lure due to
priming from the DRM list must have achieved sufficient strength to exceed a threshold that
produces false remembering.  Thus, the memory test serves simply as a proxy measure for
activation strength of the critical lure that was primed by the DRM associates, activation which in
turn primes solutions to CRAT problems.
These findings are important in two senses.  First, they extend the domain of false memory
priming from their benefits on other (implicit and explicit) memory tasks to benefits in higher
cognitive (problem solving) processes.  Second, they have uncovered an important,
developmentally invariant precondition for the effectiveness of false memories as primes (at least
for problem solving tasks), namely, that false memories must become sufficiently activated that
they become part of the output queue on memory tests.
How can we know whether the observed effects are due to the generation of false
memories at encoding, the activation of the critical lure during retrieval, or both?  To answer this
question we need to establish that priming occurs even when the recall test is absent.  The
conundrum here, however, is that changes in problem solving were observed only when the
critical lure was sufficiently activated in memory that it was falsely remembered.  Because
problem solving is only enhanced under these conditions, the recall test is needed to determine
which problems will benefit from priming.  Because such tests must come after encoding but
before problem solving, the act of retrieval is confounded with changes in CRAT solutions.  To
show that these effects are due to priming from the activation of the critical lure during list
encoding and not during retrieval, we need to find a way to dissociate these effects.
Experiment 2
            To resolve this problem, consider three issues.  First, because there is a growing consensus
that false memories are generated during the encoding phase of the DRM task and not during
retrieval (see Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009), the likelihood that the critical lure was
generated only during the recall test itself is relatively low.  Although there is little doubt that the
act of recalling an item during a memory test enhances its activation at that time, we argue that the
main priming effect came from the generation of the critical lure during encoding.
            Second, Experiment 1 showed that in order to properly conditionalize problem-solving
success there needs to be a prior test of memory.  The problem here is that simply switching the
type of test (e.g., using recognition rather than recall) will not help.  Indeed, recognition tests can
cause additional problems because they require the problem solution (i.e., the critical lure) be
presented prior to the problem itself.  Thus, if problem solving is enhanced we cannot know
whether this was due to the critical lure being generated during encoding, it having been presented
on a recognition test, or both.  It was because of this additional problem associated with
recognition tests that we chose to use recall in Experiment 1.
            Third, rather than interpose a memory test between DRM list presentation and the CRAT
task, we could have followed list presentation with the CRAT task and then conduct the memory
(recall or recognition) test.  Unfortunately, this too introduces a new set of problems.  Specifically,
performance on the memory test (i.e., false recall or recognition of the critical lures in question) is
now confounded with both of the prior tasks, list presentation and the CRAT.  Here, any increased
acceptance rates for critical lures on a later memory test could be due to generation of the critical
lure during list encoding, generation of the critical lure as the solution to the CRAT during
problem solving, or both.  It was because of this addition problem that we opted to administer the
recall test between list encoding and problem solving in Experiment 1.
            Given these considerations, it may be that the methodology used in Experiment 1 is the
least problematic.  However, this does not alleviate the problem that falsely recalling the critical
lure on the memory test can increase its activation level and may have contributed to the findings
we obtained in the first experiment.  In order to avoid this inevitable confound, we conducted an
experiment without the intervening memory test where participants were presented DRM lists and
then solved problems.  Unfortunately, although this solution does remove the memory test
confound, it is not ideal because we cannot discriminate between problems that were solved when
false recollection of the critical lure occurred versus when it did not.  However, in light of prior
evidence that participants are likely to generate a sufficient number of false memories during
encoding even in the absence of a memory test, we anticipated that the primed CRATs should be
solved at a higher rate and more quickly on average than those CRATs that were not primed.  By
removing the possibility that priming could be an artifact of a preceding memory test, we can




            A new sample of 11 children (M = 10 years, 8 months; SD = 4 months) and 11 adults (M =
18 years, 5 months; SD = 8 months) participated in the experiment.  Parental consent was obtained
for all child participants as well as their own assent on the day of testing.  Adult participants
provided written informed consent prior to the study.  Child participants were drawn from
predominantly White, middle-class schools.  All participants were fluent in English.
Design, Materials, and Procedure
            The same basic design, materials, and procedure were employed here as in Experiment 1.
A within-participant design was used where each participant was primed on half of the CRAT
problems with a preceding DRM list whose critical lure was also the solution to one of the CRAT
problems.  No memory tests were administered so participants first studied a list that was
presented verbally and were then given the age-appropriate distractor task.  Once this had been
repeated for each of the four lists, participants completed all eight CRAT problems as before.
Results and Discussion
            Because no memory test was administered, we cannot assess false memory rates.  The
mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) were
calculated for each participant (see Table 3) and analyzed separately in a series of analyses of
variance (ANOVAs).  Again because there was no memory test, the analyses focused solely on
primed (list presented) versus unprimed (no list presented) CRAT solution rates and solution
times.  For purposes of comparison, we have added collapsed primed and unprimed statistics from
Experiment 1 in Table 3.  As anticipated, the trends were similar regardless of whether or not a
memory test preceded CRAT problems.  Below, we present the analyses for the Experiment 2
data.
Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for priming, F(1, 20) = 86.81, p < .001,
(2p = .813, where solution rates were higher for primed problems (M = .79) than unprimed
problems (M = .56).  Concerning solution times, there was also a main effect for priming, F(1, 20)
= 64.67, p < .001, (2p = .764, where solution times were faster for primed problems (M = 18.76)
than unprimed problems (M = 28.79).  As expected given the use of age-normed materials, there
were no main effects for age or any Age x Priming interactions.
            What these results show is that even in the absence of an intervening memory test,
participants performed better on CRATs that were primed than those that were not primed.
Apparently, the problem solving advantage observed in Experiment 1 was due mainly to false
memory generation at encoding and was not the result of retrieval processes on an intervening
recall test.
General Discussion
Together, these results are consistent with earlier findings with adults (Howe et al., in
press) and are the first to show that false memories, if sufficiently activated during encoding to be
erroneously produced on a retrieval test, can prime both children’s and adults’ insight-based
problem solving.  Moreover, these developmentally invariant priming effects are not due to
administering a recall test prior to the problem-solving task, but rather, are due to participants
generating the critical lures at encoding.  These effects were observed both in terms of problem
solving success rates as well as the speed with which problems were solved.
This outcome is similar to findings in which falsely recalled critical lures facilitate
performance on related implicit and explicit memory tests (McDermott, 1997; McKone &
Murphy, 2000) and are consistent with spreading activation models of false memory illusions
(e.g., Howe et al., 2009; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Underwood, 1965).  Here, critical lures
become highly activated during encoding of related list items (“superadditive priming” – see
Hancock, Hicks, & Marsh, 2003) and this activation causes participants to, at the very least,
falsely remember them as part of the studied list and at most to consciously think of the critical
lure word.  The importance of the present research is that it extends the domain of false memory
priming effects beyond changes on related memory tests to priming answers on more complex,
problem-solving tasks.  Moreover, these findings are the first to demonstrate that false memories
not only prime adults’ problem solving but serve the same purpose in children’s performance on
insight-based problem-solving tasks.  Although we intentionally used CRATs that were age-
normed, ones that were rated by both children and adults as being relatively easy to solve, these
age invariant effects are nonetheless important.  Indeed, these findings are consistent with the idea
that similar spreading activation mechanisms may be operating in both DRM memory illusions
and insight-based problem solving in children as well as adults.
Our results have other important implications.  First, although there exist clear differences
between true and false memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), the current findings add to the
growing literature suggesting that false memories can exhibit effects very similar to that observed
for true memories (Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005; Kokinov, 1990).  Second, the results add to an
emerging consensus that false memories, like false beliefs (McKay & Dennett, 2009), can have
beneficial effects in human cognition (Howe & Derbish, 2010) and not simply the negative
consequences we are all familiar with in the forensic (e.g., eyewitness memory) literature.
Although some may interpret false memories as negative regardless of their subsequent “use”, we
believe that this by-product of a powerful reconstructive memory system is positive (also see
Howe et al., in press).  Indeed, we think the current research has taken us a step closer to realizing
at least one beneficial aspect of false recollection and that it has helped establish that false
memories, like true memories, can and do provide significant advantages when it comes to more
complex cognitive processes, specifically insight-based problem solving for both children and
adults.
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Appendix: DRM Lists and CRAT Problems
                        DRM lists and CRAT Problems Used for 11-year-olds.
                        DRM                                                               CRAT
BLACK – white, dark, cat, charred, night,                 BLACK – mail, board, jack.
color, grief, death, ink, bottom, coal,
brown, gray.
COLD – hot, snow, warm, winter, ice,                       COLD – sore, feet, war.
frigid, chilly, heat, weather, freeze,
shiver, arctic, frost.
LION – tiger, circus, jungle, den, Africa,                   LION – cub, tamer, king.
mane, cage, feline, roar, fierce, bears,
hunt, pride.
SLEEP – bed, rest, awake, tired, dream,                     SLEEP – walk, beauty, over.
wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber,
snore, nap, yawn.
CHAIR – table, sit, legs, seat, couch,                         CHAIR – rocking, wheel, high.
desk, recliner, sofa, wood, swivel,
stool, sitting, bench.
SPIDER – web, insect, bug, fright, fly,                      SPIDER – widow, bite, house.
arachnid, crawl, tarantula, poison, creepy,
animal, ugly, feelers.
NEEDLE – pin, eye, sewing, sharp,                           NEEDLE – thread, pine, knitting.
point, prick, thimble, haystack, thorn,
hurt, injection, syringe, knitting.
SWEET – sour, candy, sugar, bitter,                           SWEET – tooth, sixteen, heart.
good, taste, nice, honey, soda,
chocolate, cake, tart, pie.
DRM lists and CRAT Problems Used for 18-year-olds.
                        DRM                                                               CRAT
APPLE – core, orchard, pear, pie, fruit,                      Apple – pine, crab, sauce.
banana, rotten, Newton, cobbler, orange,
juice, peach, plum.
BLACK – white, dark, cat, charred, night,                 BLACK – mail, board, jack.
color, grief, death, ink, bottom, coal,
brown, gray.
COFFEE – caffeine, tea, cafe, drip, cup,                    COFFEE – break, bean, cake.
grind, mug, cream, doughnut, instant,
sip, sugar, cups.
GUN – pistol, trigger, weapon, bullet,                                    GUN – fight, control, machine.
rifle, shoot, shot, bang, hunting, cannon,
piston, gangster, violence.
PEN – pencil, write, fountain, leak, quill,                   PEN – knife, light, pal.
felt, Bic, scribble, crayon, Cross, tip,
marker, cap.
MOON – crescent, crater, astronaut, star,                   MOON – shine, beam, struck.
sun, earth, rocket, midnight, half,
gravity, telescope, sunset, astronomy.
FOOT – shoe, hand, toe, kick, sandals,                      FOOT – hold, print, stool.
soccer, yard, walk, ankle, arm, boot,
sock, knee.
TREE – oak, sap, stump, leaf, pine,                            TREE – palm, show, house.
forest, elm, branch, leaves, moss,
bush, maple, Christmas.
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